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2.1  Introduction 
On 1 May 1981 the Japanese agreed to limit their exports of  auto- 
mobiles to the U.S. market. Since the voluntary export restraint (VER) 
applies to the number of  autos exported to the U.S. (and not their total 
value), we expect that Japanese auto producers will shift the composition 
of  exports toward higher priced, higher quality cars (Gomez-Ibanez et al. 
1983). In this way they are able to maintain the maximum profit per unit 
sold, while staying within the quantity restraint. Such a response to quota 
restrictions can be obtained from simple theoretical models (see section 
2.4) and has been observed within the textile and shoe industries (Bald- 
win 1982). 
This quality shift has important implications for the employment and 
welfare effects of  the VER. It is reasonable to assume that consumers 
demand the services of  automobiles, where services are measured by 
automobile size, horsepower, comfort, and so forth. For a single car, the 
services provided are a measure of  quality. Then a change in the price of 
Japanese automobile services will lead to a welfare loss for consumers 
and a substitution toward American models. For example, if  due to the 
VER the average price of Japanese auto imports rises by 10 percent, but 
in addition the average quality of imports improves by 7 percent, then we 
would conclude that the price of services obtained from these imports has 
increased by only 10 -  7 = 3 percent. This 3 percent effective price rise 
would determine the consumer welfare loss and the extent of  substitution 
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away from Japanese models. Clearly, from this example, only looking at 
the change in purchase price, with no adjustment for quality, can be quite 
misleading in assessing the impact of  the VER. A  precise  empirical 
measure of  automobile quality is thus essential to our study. 
After reviewing background data on the U.S.  auto industry in section 
2.2, a preliminary inspection of  the VER is given in section 2.3.  The 
number of imported Japanese autos met the restriction, and a substantial 
price  increase-quite unprecedented  by  recent historical standards- 
occurred following the export restraint. In section 2.4  we review relevant 
theory concerning import restrictions and quality shifts. By focusing on 
the aggregate price  of  services obtained from Japanese imports, our 
analysis goes beyond the traditional framework which relates consumer 
welfare to the purchase price, unadjusted for quality. However, like the 
traditional framework, we relate consumer welfare to the aggregate im- 
port price. Thus, we do not attempt to measure the consumer loss or gain 
from a shifting composition of import models within an aggregate level of 
services. Such an exercise would be beyond the scope of  the present 
study. 
To measure the quality shift in imports, we have collected data on retail 
price and characteristics (e.g., length, horsepower, etc.) of  twenty-two 
Japanese models for 1980,1981, and 1982. The quality of automobiles is 
measured as the predicted price from hedonic regressions in which model 
prices are regressed on characteristics (see Griliches 1971). The qual- 
ity-adjusted or service prices, which determine consumer demand and 
welfare, are measured by  the residuals from the hedonic regressions. 
Using this method, in section 2.5 we identify three Japanese models 
which experienced substantial retail price, quantity, and quality increases 
following the VER with reductions in quality-adjusted price:  Toyota 
Cressida, Toyota Celica Supra, and Datsun 810 Maxima. 
In section 2.6 we apply hedonic regressions to eleven small and thirty- 
three large U.S. models for 1980 and 1981. Among the U.S. small cars, 
there is very little quality change and lower price rises than for other U.S. 
models. By comparing the results for Japanese imports and U.S. small 
cars, we conclude that about two-thirds of  the import price rise following 
the VER  is  due to quality improvement, with the remaining one-third a de 
fact0 price increase. This is a major conclusion of  our study. 
In section 2.7 we apply the results of  earlier sections to estimate the 
U.S employment and welfare effects of the VER. Since a major part of 
the import price rise is explained by quality improvement, the employ- 
ment and welfare effects are both quite small. We estimate that between 
1980 and 1981 the welfare loss was approximately 3 percent of  revenue 
spent on Japanese imports. In the first year of the VER, unemployment 
in U.S.  autos was reduced by 5 percent or less of existing layoffs, with the 
exact magnitude depending on the import elasticity of  demand. 37  Voluntary Export Restraint 
2.2  Recent Experience in US.  Autos 
On 1 May  1981 the Japanese government  announced a three-year 
system of  “voluntary export restraints” (VER) on the export of  auto- 
mobiles to the U.S. market. For the period from April 1981 to March 
1982 these exports would not exceed 1.68 million units, while for the 
second year (April 1982  to March 1983) the export ceiling  would be raised 
by  16.5 percent of  the growth in the U.S. market. At the end of  the 
second year, a decision about whether to extend the export restraint for a 
third year would be made. Later the Japanese government announced 
that  the exports of  certain  “utility”  vehicles (e.g.,  the Subaru Brat, 
Toyota Land Cruiser and Van) would be limited to 82,500 units over the 
initial year, and exports to Puerto Rico would not exceed 70,000. Thus, 
total Japanese exports for all these vehicles in the initial year would not 
exceed 1,832,500 units. On 29 March 1982 it was announced that the 
system of  VER in place during the first year of the agreement would be 
extended without change to the second year (presumably because of the 
lack of growth in the U.S. market). The export limits are administered by 
the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which 
allocates fixed proportions of  the total export quantity to the Japanese 
producers; this method of  restricting exports does not violate U.S. anti- 
trust law. 
These actions were made against a background of  falling production 
and high  unemployment  in  U.S. autos, along with  several legislative 
attempts to curb imports. For example, on 5 February 1981 Senators 
Danforth and Bentsen introduced a bill (S.396) to impose quotas on the 
import of automobiles from Japan of 1.6 million units during 1981,1982, 
and 1983. Indeed, this bill was scheduled for markup (line-by-line revi- 
sion) in the Senate Finance Committee on May 12 and no doubt contrib- 
uted to the specific action announced by the Japanese on May 1. Other 
outstanding bills include  more stringent import quotas and domestic 
content requirements which specify the minimum content of  Ameri- 
can-made parts for autos sold in the United States. 
An earlier legislative action was the petition for import relief made by 
the UAW in June 1980 to the U.S.  International Trade Commission 
(ITC). In August  1980 the Commission received a petition for similar 
import relief from the Ford Motor Company. Under this legislation a 
recommendation for relief can be given only if the “increased imports of 
an article are a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the 
domestic industry.” The statute defines the term “substantial cause” as 
“a cause which is important and not less than any other cause.” The ITC 
determined  that, while  imports of  autos into the United  States had 
increased and the domestic industry was in fact injured, the recession in 
the United States was a greater cause of  injury than the increased im- 38  Robert C.  Feenstra 
ports. Accordingly, import relief was not given. The shift in consumer 
preferences toward small, fuel-efficient autos (due in part to rising gaso- 
line prices) was also found to be an important cause of injury, but less 
important than the recessionary conditions. 
Recent data on imports of  passenger autos (including the “utility” 
vehicles referred to above) are reported in table 2.1. In the first row, first 
column it can be seen that actual Japanese imports for April 1981 to 
March 1982 essentially met the limit of  1,832,500 units. This represents a 
fall in quantity of 9 percent from the previous year and can be contrasted 
with  an average annual rise  of  14 percent in imports over  1978-80. 
Comparing the April  1981 to March  1982 imports with those of  the 
previous year, and noting that imports had been rising, we certainly 
expect that the VER restricted imports by at least 180  thousand units. The 
actual extent of  restrictions may be significantly higher and will be esti- 
mated in section 2.7. 
Data on U.S. factory sales, consumption, and import market shares 
(ratios of imports to consumption) are also shown in table 2.1. Note that 
consumption fell continually over the years with a larger fall from 1979  to 
1980, whereas import market shares show an abrupt rise in 1979-80  but 
only small changes in other periods. The rising import market share over 
1979-80 is largely attributable to Japanese imports. Despite this larger 
share, the ITC  found that the decline in US.  consumption over the same 
period was a more important cause of injury to the domestic industry.’ As 
factory sales have been reduced, employment has decreased at a slightly 
slower rate, resulting in a fall in the average product of labor shown in 
table 2.1 (eighth row).  Along with the reduction in sales, of  course, 
profits of  the auto manufacturers have been cut dramatically. 
2.3  Effect of the VER 
To determine the employment effect of the VER during its first year of 
operation, an initial calculation could proceed as follows. Suppose that 
for each unit of import reduced by the VER, US.  production rises by one 
unit. (We shall argue below that this assumption is false, however, due to 
imperfect substitution and quality change in imports.) Then if the VER 
reduced Japanese imports by  at least 180 thousand units, as discussed 
above, this could lead to a rise in U.S. employment of at least 180/9.5 = 
19 thousand workers, where we have used a middle value (9.5) of  the 
average product of labor appearing in table 2.1. The increased employ- 
ment of  19,000 can be compared with indefinite layoffs in  the auto 
industry  approaching 200,000 in late 1981 (see U.S.  Department  of 
Transportation 1982). Thus, the VER could affect at least one-tenth of 
the unemployment in autos during its first year. Of course, additional 
jobs would also be created in the rest of the economy? 39  Voluntary Export Restraint 
However, the employment impact of the VER may have been less than 
this estimate due to a shift of Japanese exports toward higher valued cars. 
Thus, at the bottom of  table 2.1 we show the total value of  Japanese 
imports and the average value (or price) obtained as the ratio of value to 
quantity. Over the period 1978-80  the average price of Japanese auto 
imports rose at an average rate of  6 percent, below the general rate of 
inflation. However, in the first year of the VER the price jumped by 17.4 
percent as compared with the previous year. Annual inflation over the 
April 1980 to March 1982 period (as measured by  the consumer price 
index) was 9.6 percent, which leaves a real increase of  17.4 -  9.6 = 7.8 
percent in import prices. Alternatively, we can compare the rise in prices 
from April 1980 to March 1982 with earlier years and obtain an unex- 
pected increase of  17.4 -  6 = 11.4 percent in import prices. In any case, 
it is clear from the data that the rise in average value during the initial year 
of the VER was quite unprecedented by recent historical standards and 
can be assumed to be a direct result of the export restraint. The average 
price of  U.S. autos for some periods are shown for comparison; more 
recent figures will be computed in section 2.6. 
The rise in average import prices may be achieved by (a) a simple rise in 
prices reflecting scarcity in the market; (b) a shift of Japanese exporters 
toward higher priced existing models which are larger, heavier, have 
greater horsepuwer, and so forth; (c) the introduction of  new, or mod- 
ified, models which are also larger, heavier, and the like. We shall refer to 
the specific features of  a model such as weight and horsepower as “char- 
acteristics” and the bundle of characteristics embodied in a particular car 
as the “quality.” With this terminology, the rise in average import price 
following the VER may be decomposed into a rise in quality (either 
within or across models) and a residual change in the price after adjusting 
for quality. 
To evaluate the effect of the VER on consumer welfare, we shall have 
to measure the extent of quality change in Japanese imports. This shall be 
done in section 2.5 using hedonic regressions. In the following section we 
briefly review relevant theory concerning quality shifts in response to 
quota restrictions. 
2.4  Theory of Import Restrictions and Quality Shifts 
The theoretical impact of tariffs and quotas on import quality has been 
examined in Falvey (1979), Rodriguez (1979), and Santoni and Van Cott 
(1980). Falvey analyzes the case of fixed quality for each imported good 
but a shifting composition of imports. His analysis can be briefly summa- 
rized as follows. 
Consider two import goods with unit costs c1 and c2,  where c1 >  c2 so 
that good 1  is the higher cost, higher quality item. In the absence of trade Table 2.1  New Passenger Automobiles 
April 1981 to 
March 1982  March 1981  1980  1979  1978 
April 1980 to 
Quantity (thousands of  units; thousands of  employees) 
Japanese imports  1,833.3  2,012  1,992  1,617  1,563 
Total imports  2,840  3,037  3,116  3,006  3,025 
U.S. factory sales  5,602"  6,220b  6,400  8,419  9,165 
Apparent U.S. 
consumption  7,962  8,684  8,904  10,643  11,505 
Ratio of  Japanese 
imports to U.S. 
consump.  (percent)  23.0  23.2  22.4  15.2  13.6 
imports to U.S. 
consump. (percent)  35.7  35.0  35.0  28.2  26.3 
Ratio of  total 
Average employment'  642  662  691  904  922 
Ratio of  U.S. factory 
sales to employment  8.7  9.4  9.3  9.3  9.9 Value (millions of  dollars) and Average Price 
Japanese imports  9,421  8,804  8,229  6,471  5,771 
Ratio of  Jap. import 
value to quantity  5,139  4,376  4,131  4,002  3,692 
Ratio of  U.S. pro- 
duction to quantityd  -  -  6,097  6,014  5,829 
SOURCES:  Bureau of  Labor  Statistics,  1981, Supplement  to Employment  and  Earnings:  Revised  Establishment  Data, August and later issues; U.S. 
International Trade  Commission,  1982, The  U.S. Automobile Industry: Monthly Report  on Selected  Economic Indicators,  Publication  1244, May, 
Washington, D.C., tables 1, 2, 4; U.S. International Trade Commission, 1981, Automotive Trade Statistics, 19641980, Publication 1203, December, 
Washington, D.C., tables 1,2,3;  U.S. International Trade Commission, 1980, Certain Motor Vehicles  and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, Publication 
1110, December, Washington, D.C., table 19. 
"Domestic production, May 1981 to April 1982. 
bDomestic production, May 1980 to April 1981. 
'Employment  in SIC 3711 (motor vehicles and car bodies) plus SIC 3714 (motor vehicle parts and accessories). 
dProducer's shipments; 1980 figure is for January to June. Later data were not available. 42  Robert C. Feenstra 
restrictions  and  assuming  competition  (Falvey  also  considers  the 
monopoly case), we have p1 = c1 >  p2 = c2,  where pi  is the price of good 
i. In the presence of an ad valorem tariff of rate t, we could havepf = (1 + 
t)ci, for i = 1  and 2, which impliesp;/p;  = p1/p2, so the relative price of 
the goods is unchanged. In this case we expect that the relative quantities 
imported are also unchanged.  However, in the presence of  a quota or 
VER on the sum of  imports (over both goods), suppliers would ensure 
that the profits earned per unit imported are equalized in either good. 
That is, pi -  c1 = pi -  c2,  where pf  are the postquota domestic prices. 
But an equal increase in the price of  each good implies a lowerpercentage 
increase in the price of good 1, since p1 > p2 initially. In other words, 
p;/p;  <  p1/p2, so the relative price has decreased for the higher quality 
good. Correspondingly, we expect a larger relative quantity imported of 
this good. 
Rodriguez, on the other hand, considers a single import good where 
competitive firms choose the optimal quality. He  assumes that the import 
demand applies to the services the good provides, where services equal 
(1)  S=xQ, 
and S = import demand for services; Q  = number of  physical units 
imported; and x  = amount of services provided per physical unit, or the 
unit quality content. 
Rodriguez demonstrates that an ad valorem tariff will not affect the 
quality  level x  chosen by  producers.  However, in the presence  of  a 
binding quota or  VER on  imports, the quality content x will be increased. 
The welfare cost from the VER is shown in figure 2.1.  DD’ is the 
import demand curve for services,p denotes the price of services, and the 
free-trade equilibrium  is at Eo. As  demonstrated  by  Rodriguez, the 
export restraint will lead to a rise in the price of imported services, with a 
new equilibrium such as El. Since the exporting country receives the 
higher price and thus the quota rents, the loss to the importing country is 
given by the entire shaded region under the import demand curve. This 
loss is approximately measured by 
(2)  Ls = (P1 -  P0)Sl + (W(P1 -  Porno -  Sl). 
It is interesting to compare the appropriate measure of  loss (L,) with 
that obtained if  the change in quality were not considered. That is, 
suppose we incorrectly measure the loss by the change in physical quan- 
tity imported and corresponding price. Since  x is the quality content of  a 
physical unit, px is the price per physical unit. Then the quantity measure 
of  loss would be 
(3  1  LQ = (Pixi -Poxo)Qi 
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Effect of  VER on services. 
where the subscript 0 (or 1) refers to pre- (or post-) VER. It can be shown 
that 
(4)  LQ -Ls  = (1/2)@1  -xo)(PoQi  +Pi  Qo). 
With unit quality rising after the VER, x1  >  xo, so the physical quantity 
measure of  loss L, overstates the actual loss Ls. Indeed, relative to the 
total income spent on importables, the extent of overstatement is approx- 
imately equal to the percentage increase in unit quality. 
We have been implicitly assuming that the imported good is a perfect 
substitute for the domestic product. If  instead they are imperfect subsri- 
tutes, then the change in the imported services price fromp, top, will shift 
the entire domestic demand curve, and a new equilibrium domestic price 
would be obtained. Let us suppose that the import demand curve DD' in 
figure 2.1 is drawn while allowing the domestic price to adjust to its new 
equilibrium levels. Then it can be argued (see Tarr 1980, pp. 11-15)  that 
the shaded area in figure 2.1 is still an appropriate measure of  welfare 
loss. This result is obtained essentially because the change in consumer 44  Robert C. Feenstra 
surplus in the domestic market is exactly offset by a change in producer 
surplus. 
Finally, we should mention an important qualification to our measure 
of welfare loss (Ls).  We shall estimate this welfare loss using the aggre- 
gale price of  services from Japanese imports. By this method, we are 
ignoring any consumer gain or loss from a shifting composition of import 
models within the aggregate level of  services. Measuring the welfare 
component would be beyond the scope of the present study but could be 
initiated using the recent theoretical models of monopolistic competition 
and trade (Helpman 1981, Krugman 1979, 1980, Lancaster 1980). Only 
recently, however,  have these  models been  extended to incorporate 
import restrictions (Feenstra and Judd 1982, Lancaster 1982, Venables 
1982). One result from these models is that only under very special 
assumptions will the market equilibrium lead to a socially optimal quan- 
tity and range of product varieties (see Feenstra and Judd 1982, sec. 1). It 
follows that the shift in the composition of import models induced by the 
VER, holding the aggregate level of  services fixed, can raise or lower 
consumer welfare in general. Thus, by ignoring this welfare component 
we may be understating or overstating the actual welfare loss. 
2.5  Model Data and Quality of Japanese Imports 
To analyze more closely the impact of  the VER, data on twenty-two 
Japanese models over the calendar years  1980, 1981, and 1982 were 
obtained fom the annual Automotive News Market Data Book. These 
data included quantity imported into the United States (except for 1982), 
suggested retail price in March or April for the base version (i.e., without 
options) of  each model, and characteristics including length, weight, 
horsepower, miles per gallon, and others. The twenty-two imported 
models were comprehensive except that: (a) “utility” vehicles (e.g., the 
Subaru Brat), referred to in section 2.2, were omitted; (b) import quanti- 
ties of  individual models included both station wagon and nonwagon 
quantities (e.g., Toyota Corolla sedan plus wagon), whereas only the 
price and characteristics of  nonwagon imports were obtained? 
Summary information for the Japanese imports is shown in table 2.2 
(upper portion). The  quantity imported fell by 57,000 units from calendar 
year 1980 to 1981. In addition, the average price (computed as a ratio of 
total value to quantity) shows a substantial increase of 19.8 percent over 
this period. Thus, while the calendar year periods do not correspond 
exactly  to  those of  the VER  (i.e.,  April  1981 to March  1982), the 
qualitative behavior of  the aggregate data is similar to that in table 2.1. 
Accordingly, we feel that a careful study of the model data will be useful 
in assessing the impact of the VER. 45  Voluntary Export Restraint 
Table 2.2  Sample of Automobiles 
Percent 
Change from 
1981  1980  1980 to 1981" 
Japanese imports: 
Quantity (1,000) 
Price  ($)b 
Quality ($y 





Quality  ($) 
U.S. small car production: 



















-  3.3 
19.8 
6.0 
-  9.3 
11.4 
0.7 
-  12.3 
16.8 
4.7 
"Difference in the natural logarithms. 
b1982 average price computed using 1981 quantities is $6,306. 
'1982  quality computed using 1981-82  regression and 1981 quantities is $5,236. 
A scatter plot of  the quantity change from 1980 to 1981  for individual 
models  is  shown in  figure 2.2.  The greatest percentage increase was 
obtained by the Toyota Cressida and Datsun 810 Maxima, the second and 
third most expensive models. (Note that the Toyota Starlet is an outlier, 
since this model was just introduced in 1980 leading to a high quantity 
increase in 1981.) The most expensive 1980 model was the Toyota Supra, 
a luxury sports version of  the Celica. While this model experienced an 
import decline from 1980 to 1981, during the first seven months of  1982 
Supra imports had substantially exceeded import sales during all of 1981." 
Indeed, on an annual basis the import gain from 1981 to 1982 can be 
computed as 105 percent, placing the Supra up with the Cressida and 
Maxima as obtaining the largest import gains. 
A glance at the other models  in figure 2.2 certainly  confirms our 
hypothesis  that,  due to the VER,  the composition of  imports shifts 
toward higher quality models. Next to the Cressida and Maxima, the next 
highest quantity gain is 30 percent (excluding the Starlet). The great 
majority of models are priced below $7,000, where there is no discernable 
trend in quantity changes. The model with the worst quantity decline- 
the Toyota Corona-will  appear as an extreme point in following figures. 
In figures 2.3 and 2.4 the price increases for 1980-81 and 1981-82 are 
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Fig. 2.2  Quantity change in Japanese imports, from 1980 to 1981. 
Supra (for 1981-82)  record some of the largest price rises. The question 
then is how the import gains were accomplished in the face of  higher 
prices. One possibility is that these three models experienced significant 
quality improvements, making them attractive to buyers despite the  price 
increases. We shall examine this possibility now, using hedonic regres- 
sions. (The basic reference on this technique is Griliches 1971; see also 
Triplett 1975.) 
In hedonic regressions we  attempt to explain the variation in auto- 
mobile prices using information on model characteristics. Specifically we 
shall regress the natural logarithms of  Japanese model prices on their 
length, weight, horsepower, gas mileage, and dummy variables for five- 
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Fig. 2.3  Price change in Japanese imports, from 1980 to 1981. 
gressions for 1980-81 and 1981-82 are shown in the first two columns of 
table 2.3. 
Since the dependent price variable is measured as a natural log, the 
coefficients in the regressions can be interpreted as the proportionate 
change in price from a unit change in the independent variable.  For 
example, in the 1980-81  regression for Japanese imports, an increase in 
length of one foot reduces the model price by an estimated 16 percent. 
Similarly, an increase in weight of  one ton increases the model price by 77 
percent. It can be seen that the presence of a five-speed transmission or 
air-conditioning  as standard features  are positively related  to  price, 
whereas gas mileage is negatively related. The standard errors of  the 
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Price change in Japanese imports, from 1981 to 1982. 
insignificantly different from zero. Overall, the regression  is able to 
explain 90 percent of the variation in model prices with a total of forty- 
four observations over the two years. 
The regression for Japanese imports in 1981-82  is similar to that of 
1980-81.  In either case, additional explanatory variables were consid- 
ered, including interior  room  area, turning circle, number  of  doors, 
hatchback, and others? However, these variables were generally insig- 
nificant and of  the “wrong” sign. One useful explanatory variable that 
was not available is dealer discounts, which were used extensively in 1981 
(see U.S. Department of  Transportation 1982). 
The last variable in each regression is a dummy for the next year. The 
coefficient of  this variable can be interpreted as the average rise in model 
prices not explained by the improvement in characteristics. Thus, for 49  Voluntary Export Restraint 
Table 2.3  HedoNc Regressions (dependent variable: natural logarithm of 
model price) 
Japanese  Japanese  U.S. Small  U.S. Large 
1980-81  1981-82  1980-81  1980-81 
Obs. = 44  Obs. = 44  Obs. = 22  Obs. = 66 
RZ  = 0.90  RZ  = 0.93  R2  = 0.80  RZ  = 0.95 
Intercept  9.56'  9.28*  7.96*  8.99* 
(0.82)  (0.69)  (0.55)  (0.4) 
Length (feet)  -  0.16*  -  0.10  0.14*  -  0.16* 
(0.069)  (0.054)  (0.040)  (0.023) 
Weight (tons)  0.77  0.47  -  0.48  1.48* 
(0.41)  (0.30)  (0.26)  (0.16) 
Horsepower  0.74*  0.54*  -0.20  -0.27 
(100 HP)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.30)  (0.093) 
Gas mileage  -0.78  -0.57  -2.29*  1.84* 
(100 MPG)  (0.76)  (0.64)  (1.08)  (0.80) 
Five-speed  0.080  0.15* 
Dummy variables: 
-  - 
(0.041)  (0.038) 
-  -  -  Automatic 
-  Power brakes 
0.090* 
(0.040) 
-  0.12% 
(0.042) 
0.43*  -  Air-conditioning"  0.21*  0.26* 
Year 1981  0.13*  0.089*  0.11* 
(0.066)  (0.054)  (0.050) 
(0.034)  (0.035)  (0.024) 
- 
-  -  0.057* 
(0.025) 
-  Year 1982 
*Significant at 5 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
"For Japanese models this variable indicates air-conditioning and automatic transmission, 
which were nearly perfectly correlated. 
1980-81  the suggested retail price rose by 19.8 percent, but after adjust- 
ing for quality improvements, such as greater horsepower, air-condition- 
ing, and the rest, the residual price rose by only 13 percent. The differ- 
ence between  these two figures is  the rise  in  quality  content. More 
precisely, the total import of Japanese automobile services can be mea- 
sured as the predicted price from the hedonic regression times the quan- 
tity, summed over all models:  The quality of imports is then obtained as 
the total services divided by total quantity. As shown in table 2.2, we 
measure the quality content of imports as $4,943 and $5,250 in 1980 and 50  Robert C. Feenstra 
1981, respectively, obtained using the 1980-81 regression. The difference 
between these figures gives a 6 percent rise in quality. 
The sensitivity of  this quality measurement to specification of  the 
hedonic regression can be checked by examining the “year 1981” coeffi- 
cient. For various additional explanatory variables considered, the 1981 
dummy coefficient was between 0.126 and 0.136, indicating an average 
rise in model prices not explained by  quality improvement of  approx- 
imately 13  percent, as found in table 2.3. For example, when variables for 
roominess, maneuverability, and axle ratio (a measure of durability) are 
added to the Japanese regression in table 2.3, the year 1981  coefficient is 
0.132 for 1980-81. This compares with an estimate of  0.126 for 1980-81 
when these three additional variables are excluded. If  engine displace- 
ment and horsepower/weight are used in place of horsepower and weight, 
while retaining room, maneuverability,  and axle ratio, then the 1981 
dummy coefficient is 0.136 for 1980-81.  Other combinations and addi- 
tional explanatory variables result in a coefficient between these bounds. 
The measure of quality improvement can be approximately obtained as 
the difference between the retail price increase (19.8 percent) and the 
year 1981  coefficient (13 percent). Since the latter is not very sensitive to 
the regression specification, our measure of  quality improvement appears 
to be quite robust. 
The scatter plots of the residual, or quality-adjusted, price changes for 
1980-81 and 1981-82 are shown in figures 2.5 and 2.6. Comparing figures 
2.3 and 2.5 we can see substantial difference in the price changes for the 
Supra, Cressida, and Maxima, relative to the other models. Thus, while 
the retail price increases for these models over 1980-81 were well above 
average, the quality-adjusted price increases were well below average. 
From the raw data the quality improvement of the Supra can be identified 
as an increase in horsepower and the introduction of  a five-speed trans- 
mission; the Cressida became heavier with greater horsepower; and the 
Maxima increased in weight with air-conditioning and automatic trans- 
mission added as standard equipment. 
A  similar  pattern  of  high  retail price  increase  with  much  smaller 
quality-adjusted price change can be seen for the Supra over 1981-82  in 
figures 2.4 and 2.6. These overall results neatly confirm the hypothesis 
that the quantity gain in the highest priced Japanese imports was brought 
about by a significant improvement in the quality content, as expected 
from the theory. Aside from the Cressida, Maxima, and Supra models, 
no general pattern of  price or quality change is identified. 
2.6  Model Data and Quality of U.S. Production 
In addition to the data on Japanese imports, data on prices and charac- 
teristics of  forty-four U.S.  models were also obtained from the same 51  Voluntary Export Restraint 
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source for the calendar years 1980 and 1981. Station wagons and several 
other models were omitted from the sample because of lack of  informa- 
tion. The sample will be used to make comparisons with the Japanese 
imports and to establish general conclusions in section 2.7. 
The data for U.S. small cars and large cars are summarized in table 2.2. 
(Note that the large car category includes both intermediate and large 
models.) The small cars experienced a lower price rise than large cars. 
This difference is explained in part by a changing composition within the 
large car category.  In particular, the price of  intermediate-sized  cars 
(below $8,000 in price) rose substantially more in percentage terms than 
the price of very large cars (above $8,OOO in price). The general price rise, 
then, partially reflects a quantity shift toward more expensive models 
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Fig. 2.6  Quality-adjusted price change in Japanese imports, from 1981 
to 1982. 
greater percentage quantity decline than small cars, as reported in table 
2.2. 
One  conclusion to be drawn from the summary information is that U.S. 
small car prices  do not  appear to include  a significant monopolistic 
increase over the 1980-81  period, in contrast to the prediction of  tradi- 
tional theory (see, e.g.,  Lindert and Kindleberger  1982, appendix E). 
That is, despite the export restriction, those models which compete most 
directly  with  Japanese imports-U.S.  small cars-experienced  lower 
price increases than intermediate and large cars. One possible explana- 
tion for this result is that, faced with limited availability of lower priced, 
lower quality Japanese imports, U.S. consumers did not substitute to- 
ward  small U.S.  models. Instead they could have substituted toward 53  Voluntary Export Restraint 
intermediate U.S.  models, used cars, or they could have decided to defer 
their purchases.'  To the extent that substitution did not take place toward 
U.S. cars, the employment impact of  the VER is reduced. 
Hedonic regressions were also run for U.S.  small and large cars, using 
similar explanatory variables  as in the analysis of  Japanese imports 
described in  section 2.5. The results are shown in table 2.3. The U.S. 
small car regression contains several unusual signs, with less explanatory 
power than for U.S. large cars? In the latter case, all estimated coef- 
ficients are significant  at the 5 percent level, with length having a negative 
and gas mileage a positive relation to price. 
As with the Japanese imports, the predicted prices from the hedonic 
regressions can be used to construct an estimate of total services produced 
(predicted price times quantity, summed over all models). When divided 
by the quantity of small or large cars, we then obtain a measure of quality, 
as shown in table 2.2. The quality content of  U.S. small cars increased 
only slightly from 1980 to 1981, in contrast to the substantial quality 
change of Japanese imports. For U.S.  large cars, quality increased by 4.7 
percent. This is partially explained by the quantity shift from intermedi- 
ate to very large cars as discussed above. 
2.7  Effects of  the VER within the Sample 
We shall now derive general conclusions about the effect of  the VER 
within our sample of Japanese imports and U.S.  production. In particu- 
lar, we shall investigate the U.S.  employment and welfare impact. Recall- 
ing that our sample covers the calendar years 1980 and 1981,  whereas the 
initial year of  the VER was April 1981 to March 1982, our quantitative 
results do not directly measure the effect of the VER in its first year. But 
we certainly expect that our general conclusions will carry over to other, 
similar time periods. 
Returning to table 2.2, we must first decide what portion of the 19.8 
percent rise in retail import prices is a general inflationary effect across 
producers from cost increases and simple price leadership but not related 
to the VER. We noted above that the U.S.  small car prices do not appear 
to include a significant monopolistic increase in 1981, rising by less than 
intermediate and large car prices, so it seems reasonable to regard the 
11.4 percent increase in small car prices as the general inflationary effect. 
It  follows that  the  difference  between  the  retail  price  increases  of 
Japanese imports and U.S.  small cars, or  19.8 -  11.4 = 8.4percent, is the 
increase in importprices directly caused by the VER,  after correcting for 
the inflationary effect across producers. The next question is what portion 
of this price increase is directly the result of  quality improvement. From 
table 2.2, we see that the quality improvement of the Japanese imports 
exceeded that of  U.S. small cars by 6.0 - 0.7 = 5.3 percent. That is, 54  Robert C. Feenstra 
5.318.4 or about two-thirds of  the rise in importprices can be attributed to 
quality improvement. The remaining 8.4 - 5.3 = 3.1 percent, or one- 
third of the total, is a de  facto price increase for which the consumer is not 
compensated by a change in quality. 
To obtain further  conclusions,  we  must  begin  to  introduce  some 
assumptions and parameters. In table 2.4 we give alternative values of the 
elasticity of U.S. demand for Japanese automobile services, ranging from 
2 to 5. Using these elasticities and the 3.1 percent residual price increase 
obtained above, we can readily compute the value of imported services 
restricted by the VER. In the absence of  this restraint we would have 
expected the 1981 Japanese quality to be approximately the same as in 
1980. Accordingly, we can compute the extent to which the VER re- 
stricted auto imports in the second row of table 2.4. For demand elastici- 
ties of 2 and 3, the extent of  import restrictions is measured as 220,000 
and 277,000 units, respectively. 
From the estimates reported in Toder (1978, chap. 3), a value of 1  to 2 
for the short-run elasticity of  demand for imported autos is expected, 
while the value of  3 is somewhat high. In assessing the employment 
impact of the VER during its first year, we shall thus focus on the first two 
columns of  table 2.4. The last column, with an elasticity of 5, would be 
relevant for periods exceeding one year when consumers show greater 
adjustment to a price increase. 
Let us make the strong assumption  that  the  overall  U.S.  demand 
elasticity for  domestic and Japanese autos is unity.  That is,  a  fixed 
proportion of total income is spent on these autos, and a reduction of $1 
million spent on Japanese imports because of  a price change will imply 
exactly $1 million extra spent on U.S. models. This assumption is sup- 
ported by the empirical evidence (see Toder 1978, p. 44 and the refer- 
ences cited there) that the price elasticity for all cars purchased in the 
United States is approximately one. By excluding European imports, we 
may be overstating the income which consumers continue to spend on 
Japanese and American models after a price rise. The assumption of an 
overall demand elasticity of unity, combined with specific import elastici- 
ties, permits us to model the degree of substitution between Japanese and 
U.S. models, as follows. 
For the various import elasticities in table 2.4 we can readily compute 
the additional income spent on U.S. autos because of the VER as being 
equal to the reduced income spent on Japanese imports. Dividing this 
revenue by an average 1981  price of $6,000 for cars which substitute quite 
closely with Japanese imports, we obtain the additional U.S. production 
(fourth row). These production gains can be contrasted to the number of 
auto imports restricted, with the differences due to imperfect substitu- 
tion. Further dividing the production gain by  the average product of 
labor, we obtain the additional U.S. employment (lifth row). With im- 55  Voluntary Export Restraint 
port elasticities of  2 and 3, the employment gains are 5,600 and 11,100 
workers, respectively. These figures can be compared with indefinite 
layoffs in the auto industry exceeding 200,000 in early 1982. 
Thus, the employment impact of  the VER during its first year was 5 
percent or less of existing layoffs. Further evidence would be required to 
assess the employment impact over later years, though the last column of 
table 2.4 suggests that the reduction in unemployment would be larger. 
In the last row of table 2.4 we give the correct welfare loss Ls derived in 
section 2.4 and the incorrect loss L, which ignores the quality change in 
imports. These magnitudes can be compared with 1981  expenditures on 
Japanese imports of $10,240,000.  Thus, the correct welfare loss is approx- 
imately 3.1 percent of 1981  expenditures, while the incorrect welfare loss 
is approximately 8.4 percent. These amounts are just the quality-adjusted 
and unadjusted rise in import prices, respectively, since the welfare loss 
from the VER is the entire reduction in consumer surplus (see figure 2.1) 
Table 2.4  Effects of the VER from 1980 to 1981 
Elasticity of  Demand for Japanese 
Automobile Services 
2  3  5 
Japanese services 
restricteda ($ mill)  560  840  1400 
restrictedb  (1,000)  220  277  390 




productiond (1  ,OOO)  53  106  212 
Additional U.S. 
employment" (1  $00)  5.6  11.1  22.3 
Ls  (5  327  332  342 
L, ($ mill)g  915  929  958 
Welfare loss: 
"0.031 x  elasticity x  1981 Japanese services. Services = quality x  quantity. 
"( 1981  Japanese services + services restricted)/l980 Japanese quality -  1981  Japanese auto 
imports. 
'0.031  x  (elasticity - 1) x  1981 Japanese import value. 
dAdditional U.S.  revenue/$6,000. 
eAdditional U.S. production/9.5. 
'(0.031  X  1981 Japanese services)  + 1/2 x  (0.031  x  1981 Japanese service price  x 
Japanese services restricted). Service price = nominal price/quality. 
g(0.084 X  1981 Japanese import value) + 1/2 x (0.084 x 1981  Japanese price x Japanese 
autos restricted). 56  Robert C. Feenstra 
with quota rents accruing to  Japanese producers. The specification  of the 
import elasticity only modestly affects the loss. The correct measure of 
welfare loss is about one-third of  the incorrect measure. 
2.8  Conclusions 
Our major conclusion is that two-thirds of  the increase in Japanese 
import prices following the VER was due to quality improvement, with 
the remaining one-third a de facto price rise for which the consumer is not 
compensated by a change in quality. This result was found to be quite 
insensitive to  the specification of the hedonic regressions used to measure 
quality (section 2.5). It also depends on the general inflationary price 
increase across producers, not related to the VER. Since U.S. small car 
prices rose by less than the intermediate or large car prices (section 2.6), 
we chose the former as a measure of the general inflationary increase. We 
then took the difference between the Japanese import and U.S. small car 
price  rise and regarded this amount as the increase in import prices 
directly caused by the VER. Two-thirds of  this price increase could be 
explained by quality improvement in Japanese imports. 
The residual import price rise not accounted for by quality change was 
measured as 3.1 percent. It followed that the loss to  American consumers 
in 1981 from the VER was approximately 3.1 percent of expenditure on 
Japanese imports. The exact welfare loss depends only slightly on the 
import demand elasticity, since most of  the loss comes from the quota 
rents obtained by Japanese producers.  It is also observed  that three 
Japanese models experienced substantial retail price, quantity, and qual- 
ity increases following the VER, with reductions in their quality-adjusted 
prices: the Toyota Cressida, Toyota Celica Supra, and Datsun 810 Max- 
ima. The increased imports of  these luxury models neatly confirm the 
theoretical predictions. 
Our conclusions about the effect of the VER on employment in U.S. 
autos are  subject to greater qualification. Clearly, we have not considered 
the general  equilibrium  response  of  wages to unemployment in one 
industry, or the extent to which decreased U.S. imports would result in 
lower demand for  U.S. exports. More specifically,  we have not been able 
to consider imports from countries other than Japan or the introduction 
of new U.S. models following the VER. Including European imports into 
our analysis could decrease the employment impact of the VER because 
of  substitution by U.S. consumers toward these models. On the other 
hand, introduction of  new U.S. models, such as the General Motors J-car 
(and earlier the Chrysler K-car), could present desirable alternatives for 
limited Japanese imports. While a consideration of these factors would be 
useful, our general conclusion that the employment impact of the VER 57  Voluntary Export Restraint 
was small during the first year due to quality improvement and imperfect 
substitution between  Japanese  and U.S.  autos does not  seem to be 
overstated. 
Notes 
1. Thus, suppose the import market share were held constant at its 1979 value. Then 
1980 factory sales could be estimated as 6,400 + 3,116 -  (8,904 x  0.282) = 7,005, where 
the first figure is actual 1980 sales and the next figures are actual and estimated 1980 imports. 
Factory sales in 1979 were 8,419, so the extent of decline due to falling consumption (i.e., 
recessionary conditions) is (8,419 -  7,005)/(8,419 -  6,400) = 70percent. The remaining 30 
percent of falling sales can be attributed to import competition. Precisely this type of simple 
calculation was instrumental in leading to the ITC decision. 
2. For example, the Council of  Economic Advisors (submission to Senate, 3 April 1980) 
reports that the production of  50 autos creates 10 jobs in the economy, with 2.3 workers 
employed directly in autos and 7.7 employed elsewhere. These data are from the Depart- 
ment of  Labor (apparently based on a study referenced in submission to the House of 
Representatives, 7,18  March 1980). However, the average product of labor in autos implicit 
in these figures is extremely high (50/2.3 = 22). I have been unable to account for the 
difference between this estimate and those reported in table 2.1. 
3. Dealers were contacted to try and separate the station wagon and nonwagon import 
quantities, but this proved unsuccessful. In addition, note that the imported models include 
those built for U.S. firms, such as the Chrysler-Mitsubishi Challenger, Champ, and Colt. 
Imports into Puerto Rico are not included. 
4. Imports of the Toyota Celica Supra during 1980,1981, and the first seven months of 
1982 were 21,542 units, 16,146 units, and 19,266 units, respectively. Ward’s Communica- 
tions, Inc., kindly supplied this information. Due to its overall performance, the Supra was 
chosen as Motor Trend magazine’s 1982 Import Car of  the Year. 
5.  The occurrence of air-conditioning  was very highly correlated with the occurrence of 
automatic transmissions  in the Japanese imports, so these were combined into one dummy 
variable. Also, the prices were adjusted so that all models excluded a radio. 
6. The predicted price used in this calculation  does not include that portion of  the model 
price explained by the year dummy in the regression, since the year dummy captures that 
portion of  the price not related to the physical characteristics (i.e., services) of the model. 
7. Since the 1981 US.  small and large car prices were collected  on April 10, it is of course 
possible that the small car prices had not responded to the VER simply because it was not 
announced until May 1. On the other hand, the evidence is quite strong that at least the 
Japanese had anticipated the VER in setting their prices as of 6 April 1981, which are used in 
our sample. But whether the VER was anticipated by U.S. producers or not, we still obtain 
the result that the US.  small car price rise over 1980-81  does not appear to include a 
monopolistic increase, and this result will be used in section 2.7. 
8.  At a later stage of  our research we also pooled the Japanese import and American 
small car models to test for equality of  the regression coefficients. By the usual F-test, the 
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients were equal, was com- 
puted  as 1.55. The 95  percent significance point of  the F-distribution with  degrees of 
freedom (5,60)  is 2.37, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis. In future research it would 
be useful to pool these data. 58  Robert C. Feenstra 
References 
Automotive news market data book. 1980,1981,1982. Detroit: Automo- 
tive News. 
Baldwin, Robert E. 1982. The efficacy (or inefficacy) of  trade policy. 
Frank Graham Memorial Lecture, Princeton University. 
Falvey,  Rodney  E.  1979. The composition  of  trade  within  import- 
restricted product categories. Journal of  Political Economy 87, no. 5 
(October): 1105-14. 
Feenstra, Robert C., and Kenneth L. Judd. 1982. Tariffs, technology 
transfer, and welfare. Journal of Political Economy 90, no. 6 (Decem- 
ber): 1142-65. 
Gomez-Ibanez, Jose A., Robert A. Leone, and Stephen A. O’Connell. 
1983. Restraining auto imports: Does anyone win? Journal of  Policy 
Analysis and Management 2: 196-219. 
Griliches, Zvi. 1971. Hedonic price indexes for automobiles: An econo- 
metric analysis of quality change. In Price indexes and quality change, 
ed. Zvi Griliches. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Helpman, Elhanan. 1981. International trade in the presence of product 
differentiation, economies of  scale and monopolistic competition: A 
Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin approach. Journal of  International Eco- 
nomics 11 (August):305-40. 
Krugman, Paul R. 1979. Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, 
and international trade. Journal of  International Economics 9 (Novem- 
ber) :469-79. 
. 1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern 
of  trade. American Economic Review 70 (December):950-59. 
Lancaster, Kelvin J. 1980. Intra-industry trade under perfect monopolis- 
tic competition. Journal of  Znternational Economics 10 (May): 151-75. 
. 1982. Protection and product differentiation. Columbia Uni- 
versity. Mimeo. 
Lindert,  Peter  H., and  Charles P. Kindleberger.  1982. International 
economics. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin. 
Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo.  1979. The quality of  imports and the dif- 
ferential  welfare  effects of  tariffs,  quotas, and quality controls as 
protective devices. Canadian Journal of  Economics 12, no. 3:439-49. 
Santoni, Gary J., and T. Norman Van Cott. 1980. Import quotas: The 
quality  adjustment  problem. Southern Economic Journal 46, no.  4 
(Apri1):1206-11. 
Tarr, David. Federal Trade Commission 1980. Effects of  restrictions on 
United States imports: Five case studies and theory. Washington, D.  C.: 
GPO. 
Toder, Eric J., with Nicholas Scott Cardell, and Ellen Burton.  1978. 59  Voluntary Export Restraint 
Trade policy and the U.S.  automobile industry. Charles River Associ- 
ates Research Report. New York: Praeger Publishers. 
Triplett, Jack E. 1975. Consumer demand and characteristics of  con- 
sumption goods. In Household production and consumption, ed. Nes- 
tor E. Terlecky. Conference on Research in  Income and Wealth: 
Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 40. New York: Columbia Univer- 
sity Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
U.S.  Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs. Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization. 1980. The effects of 
expanding automobile imports on the domestic economy. 96th Cong., 
2d sess., 3 April. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee 
on Trade. 1980. World auto trade: Current trends and structural prob- 
lems. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 7, 18 March. Serial 96-78. 
U.S. Department of Transportation. 1982. The U.S.  automobile industry, 
1981. May. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 
Venables, Anthony J. 1982. Optimal tariffs for trade in monopolistically 
competitive  commodities.  Journal  of  International  Economics  12 
(May) :  225-42. 
Comment  Ronald W. Jones 
Voluntary export restraints have recently attained prominence in the 
portfolio of  techniques used in exercising U.S. commercial policy, and 
this stimulating paper by Feenstra analyzes the possible effects of such a 
program on welfare and employment in the currently depressed U.S. 
automobile industry. Believing as I do in the advantages of  division of 
labor  and  in  the  doctrine of  comparative  advantage,  I  leave to my 
codiscussant from the state of Michigan remarks as to  the nuances of the 
automobile industry and concentrate, instead, on some points of  more 
theoretical interest suggested by the paper. 
The application of  VER instead of, say, a U.S. tariff or quota has the 
obvious welfare disadvantage that foreigners are invited to capture the 
rents created by the restraint. As Feenstra carefully points out, however, 
if  the composition of  the limited imports is altered in favor of  higher 
quality products, the welfare loss would be incorrectly expressed in the 
price rise. Indeed, economic theory associated with the work of Alchian 
and Allen (1972) suggests that it is in the producers’ best interest to adjust 
the product mix  in favor of  higher quality. (In their classic example, 
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transport costs are shown to lower the relative price of the higher quality 
apples in distant markets, thus explaining, for Western apple growers, 
why the “good  apples move East”).  Recently Falvey (1979) has har- 
nessed this logic to the case of quantity restrictions to argue that, unlike 
the case of  ad valorem tariffs, the  price rise associated with quotas will be 
relatively less for higher quality products. Feenstra estimates that a full 
two-thirds of  the price rise on imported Japanese automobiles was due to 
an improvement in quality and should thus not be counted as a welfare 
loss. 
This argument about quality changes does alter the traditional measure 
of welfare loss, but what can be said about employment? To the extent 
that a restriction on imports of  Japanese automobiles shifts demand 
toward home-produced autos, local employment can be expected to rise. 
However, Feenstra emphasizes that much depends on the elasticity of 
demand. Suppose demand for Japanese cars is inelastic, although, say, 
demand in the aggregate for all cars is unit elastic. Then the VER  could 
cause a reduction in the value of  demand for American-made autos 
(neglecting the effect on European imports), which, assuming no price 
fall in this area, translates into a loss of  output and jobs. Thus, argues 
Feenstra, it is not clear that the VER will raise employment of  U.S. 
autoworkers. 
I concur with this result and merely add two observations. First, the 
argument concerning employment need not rest on changes in quality, as 
does the argument  concerning welfare.  What  is required  is  inelastic 
demand for auto imports, and this can be expressed either in quality or 
quantity units.  Thus Feenstra  used  the Rodriguez  (1979) concept  of 
import demand related to the services of  a good, so that 
S=xQ, 
where Q measures the quantity of auto imports, x is a measure of services 
provided  per physical unit,  and  S is the demand for  services (from 
imports). If pQ  represents the price of  autos and ps  the price of  services, 
and if  demand for autos is inelastic so that a rise in pQ  results in: 
-Q  <PQ, 
-  j. < (Be -  2)  . 
it must be the case that 
Since ps equals pQh,  demand for services would also be inelastic. Ex- 
pressed either way, the VER could lower employment. 
A  general  equilibrium  approach, however, shifts the focus of  the 
argument. If  trade stays roughly balanced, a rise in the value of  imports 
may reduce employment in import-competing sectors, but it would be 
matched by a rise in the value of exports (and employment in exporting 61  Voluntary Export Restraint 
sectors). Similarly, if  a VER cuts back on import spending, there are 
negative employment effects in exportables to be considered in conjunc- 
tion with any employment gains in the protected sectors. Net employ- 
ment effects depend both on a comparison of labor intensities in various 
sectors of  the economy as well as on the issue raised by Feenstra as to the 
expansionary or contractionary effect in the import-competing sector. In 
any case Feenstra’s conclusion that the employment effects of  the VER 
are less obvious than the welfare effects seem supported at the econ- 
omy-wide level as well as in the U.S. auto industry. 
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Comment  Mordechai E. Kreinin 
This is an excellent paper, employing an imaginative approach to an 
important  problem. At issue is the effect of  the Japanese Voluntary 
Export Restraint in autos on U.S. welfare and employment. 
Product upgrading is a well-known outcome of any quantitative import 
restriction (import quotas, VERs) limiting the importation of  a product 
to a  specified number  of  units  without  distinction  between  brands, 
grades, or  other product attributes. Because such quantitative limitations 
are equivalent to a specific tariff, they raise the price of  cheap brands 
proportionately more than the price of expensive brands. This constitutes 
an incentive  on the part of  buyers  and of  exporters to upgrade the 
product.  Upgrading occurs in all cases where product differentiation 
exists. 
Using hedonic regressions, Professor Feenstra estimates the degree of 
product upgrading that occurred in Japanese cars exported to the United 
States as a result of  the VER. Because of  the many features of  product 
differentiation that exist in autos, I suspect that somewhat less than the 
entire degree of upgrading could have been so captured; but the author 
competently demonstrates that the “leftover” bias could not have been 
large. The author’s estimated U.S. welfare loss due to the VER, after 
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taking into account the product  upgrading, is  only one-third of  the 
estimated loss when the quality upgrading is ignored. He then proceeds 
to estimate the rise in U.S. auto output and the additional U.S. employ- 
ment attributable to the VER under alternative elasticity assumptions. 
Both effects are very small under the assumptions of  import-demand 
elasticities of 2, 3, or 5. 
Having revealed my general admiration for the paper, I shall proceed 
with specific  criticisms. They were made orally on an earlier draft, but the 
author merely recognizes them without adjusting his calculations. Some 
of  the following points have offsetting effects on the results,  but the 
extent of  the net bias cannot be determined without further calculations. 
Table C2.1 is computed from the author's table 2.1 and will be useful in 
highlighting some of  the criticisms. 
1. How  effective was the VER?  The first VER year spanned the months 
from April 1981 to March 1982, and it is the only period for which data 
were available at the time of  the author's calculations. Under the VER 
agreement, total Japanese exports were not to exceed 1,832,500 units. 
And indeed the last column (first row) in table C2.1 shows that their 
exports  were  held  to that  number.  By  subtracting that figure from 
2,012,000-Japanese  exports to the United States in the previous year- 
Table C2.1  New Passenger Cars (thousands of units) 
April 1981 
April 1980  to 
to  March 1982 
1980  March 1981  (VER period) 
Japanese imports  1,992  2,012  1,833 
Total imports  3,116  3,037  2,840 
Non-Japanese imports"  1,124  1,025  1,007 
US. factory sales  6,400  6,220  5,602 
Apparent U.S. consumption  8,904  8,684  7,962 
Ratio of Japanese import 
Ratio of  total import to 
Ratio of non-Japanese imp. 
Percentage change  1.0  -  9.8 
Percentage change  -2.6  -  6.9 
Percentage change  -9.7  -  1.8 
Percentage change  -2.9  -  11.0 
Percentage change  -2.5  -9.1 
to U.S. consumption  22.4%  23.2%  23.0% 
U.S. consumption  35.0%  35.0%  35.7% 
to U.S. consumption  12.6%  11.8%  12.7% 
"Obtained by subtraction of  row 1 from row 2 in the author's table 2.1. 63  Voluntary Export Restraint 
the author suggests that the VER restricted imports by at least 180,000 
units. But total U.S.  car output and consumption also declined by 9 and 
11  percent,  respectively,  over the same period.  Indeed the ratio of 
Japanese imports to U.S.  consumption  was reasonably  stable, at 23 
percent, over the two years. Can one attribute the entire 9.8 percent drop 
in Japanese imports to the VER? It is probably an overestimate, which is 
then reflected in the final results. 
2. The role of  European imports. Following comments on the original 
version of  the paper, the author now recognizes the existence of  Euro- 
pean  imports but  does not  incorporate  them in  his calculations.  By 
subtracting row 1  from row 2 in the author’s table 2.1, row 3 in table C2.1 
shows that non-Japanese imports account for about one-third of  total 
imports. Although the author does not explicitly say so, I am assuming 
that (following convention) Canadian imports (governed by  the US- 
Canada auto treaty) are excluded. Thus non-Japanese imports are essen- 
tially European models. 
Imported European cars cover the entire range of  quality and price. 
And the product upgrading by the Japanese means that they compete 
with the Europeans in the U.S. market in the entire product range, 
certainly  at both  ends of  the price spectrum. Because the VER was 
limited to Japan, one might expect some substitution of European (rather 
than American) models for the excluded Japanese cars. That such sub- 
stitution may have been important is clear from table C2.1. European 
imports declined by only 1.8 percent from 1981  to 1982, while Japanese 
imports declined by  9.8 percent, and U.S. auto consumption by  9.1 
percent. By making some simple assumptions about market shares (as the 
author does in other cases, such as in section 2.2), one may tentatively 
infer that over one-third of the “slack” created by the VER was picked up 
by European rather than American-built cars. 
The exclusion of  European cars from his calculations may  have  a 
profound effect on the results, especially on the estimated welfare and 
employment effects of the VER. Substitution from European models is 
likely to have scaled down the effect of the VER on U.S.  employment. In 
fact, such possible substitution must be incorporated into the author’s 
own calculations because his accompanying assumption of a fixed propor- 
tion of  consumer income spent on cars applies to all  cars, including 
European ones. 
In sum, the assumption of US.-Japanese  substitution, ignoring Euro- 
pean  imports,  affects results  throughout  the paper.  It is  possible to 
indicate the direction of the bias so created. For example, the rise in U.S. 
employment due to the VER is overestimated. Furthermore, by making 
certain credible assumptions, the estimates themselves could have been 
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3.  Is a constant share of income spent on automobiles? That assump- 
tion crops up in various places. As stated above, at best it should be 
applied to all cars, including European. 
How realistic is that assumption? Although there are not a priori 
grounds for making it, the assumption is supported by data not cited by 
the author.’ But that evidence relates only to the 1960s and 1970s. In view 
of  the profound changes that have taken place in the industry over the 
past three years, the assumption cannot be accepted on its face value for 
1980-82, the main period under study. The author needs to check explic- 
itly the validity of  the assumption (critical to parts of  his discussion) for 
the 1980s. The possibility must be recognized that if  consumers spend 
more (less) on cars they have less (more) money to spend elsewhere. 
4.  To what extent was the rise in U.S.  auto prices triggered by (resulted 
from) an increase in Japanese prices? There is evidence of  such pricing 
behavior by US.  automakers from episodes of devaluations  or deprecia- 
tions of  the dollar. This may partly account for the rise in the price of 
intermediate-sized cars. The failure of  small car prices to rise may have 
been due to depressed market conditions and to European competition 
rather than to market structure. 
5.  Effect of exchange rate changes. The sharp 1982 appreciation of the 
dollar could have depressed the dollar price of Japanese models, so the 
price rise embodied in the calculations (attributed to the VER) may be 
biased. 
6. The hedonic regressions. Although the results appear robust, the 
regressions may not have captured all quality characteristics (e.g. ,  im- 
proved carpeting or seat covers) and need to be regarded as a lower 
bound. 
A few words beyond the scope of  this well-crafted paper are in order. 
What is the cause of  the decline in the competitive position of  the U.S. 
auto industry that triggered demands for VERs and domestic content 
legislation? 
Wrong management decisions in the 1970s, especially concerning the 
product mix and perhaps the introduction of  new technology, are well- 
known. But a recent study2  shows that during the 1970s there had been a 
distinct increase in unit labor costs in the auto industry relative to that in 
U.S. manufacturing in general: Labor compensation in autos rose at a 
faster rate than its counterparts in all manufacturing, while output per 
worker rose in tandem with all manufacturing. No such change occurred 
in Japan, where both compensation and productivity in autos rose at a 
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rose in tandem. Indeed, in  1980 labor compensation in the U.S. auto 
industry was 60  percent above that of the U.S.  manufacturing  average. In 
Japan and Germany that excess is only 25 percent, while in other Euro- 
pean countries it is even lower than that. Apparently the U.S.  compara- 
tive advantage in autos has eroded. 
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